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This paper discusses the nature of the uncertainty faced by central banks and considers three
approaches to dealing with uncertainty(1) formal optimization models and robust rules based on
such models; (2) informal rules like the Taylor rule and inflation targeting; and (3) a case by case
approach based on an informal Bayesian logic. The latter case requires considering the asymmetric
nature of the risks that the central bank often faces.
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Monetary Policy in an Uncertain Environment
Martin Feldstein
*
 Monetary policy is inevitably made in an environment of substantial uncertainty.  This
has been particularly true in all of the major industrial countries in the past twelve months and
continues to be so even now.  Moreover, there has been an increased academic interest in formal
ways for central banks to deal with uncertainty, with an increasing number of important papers.
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It is therefore good to take stock of these issues, not only to benefit policy officials but
also to help economic researchers to focus their efforts. It is natural but inadequate to pose the
central question of dealing with uncertainty as: How should central bankers deal with the
uncertainties that they perceive?  I say inadequate because there is a related problem for any
central bank: recognizing that some of the facts and economic relations that it thinks it knows
may actually be wrong. A correct perception of uncertainty requires increasing the subjective
uncertainty of these variables and parameters and, more generally, to make monetary policy in a
way that reflects the possibility that the “information” on which decisions are based is incorrect.
The problem is not just that the data that policy makers have is subject to revision, often
to substantial revision. The history of monetary policy also contains a long list of fundamental
but  wrong views that were held with certainty by policy officials and widely accepted among
academic specialists. Think, for example, of measuring monetary conditions by nominal interest-2- JacksonHole.2003
rates, or judging the appropriate credit expansion by the real bills doctrine, or denying the ability
of monetary policy to change inflation.  Alan Meltzer’s monumental new book (Meltzer, 2003)
contains an impressive chronology of such false verities.
A list of just some of the uncertainties faced by the Federal Reserve  today shows the
kinds of uncertainties that are always present.  Consider for example  some of the uncertainties
associated with the key variable, the rate of productivity growth.  How fast is the productivity
growth now and how fast will it be over the coming year?  Will faster productivity growth lead
to higher labor earnings and household spending or will it lead to reduced employment and
higher unemployment?  If actual aggregate demand grows more slowly than potential GDP, will
inflation decline even if the economy is growing rapidly?  If inflation declines to less than zero,
will that start a destructive deflationary spiral or could deflation stabilize at a low negative rate? 
If faster productivity growth leads to increased unemployment, will the resulting increase in
uncertainty among employed individuals cause them to increase their saving rate, thereby
reducing the growth of aggregate demand? And how would household and business spending
respond in this environment to a further decline in the Fed funds interest rate or other changes in
monetary policy?
These current examples illustrate four kinds of uncertainty that frequently face every
central bank: uncertainty about the current and future state of the economy; uncertainty about
how the economy operates; the uncertainty of individuals about their personal futures; and
uncertainty about the impact of potential future monetary policies.-3- JacksonHole.2003
Before looking at the implications of these uncertainties for the conduct of monetary
policy, it is important to emphasize that although this uncertainty affects the ability of a central
bank to limit the variability of inflation and output, it does not limit the ability of central banks to
avoid a high and rising level of inflation.  There is no uncertainty about the key facts that can
guide central banks to low long-term inflation: that even moderate inflation is harmful; that a
high rate of inflation does not lead to a sustained low rate of unemployment or an increase in
capital investment; and that monetary policy and real interest rates are the key ways to control
inflation. So uncertainty is not an excuse for allowing inflation to go back to the bad old days.
The effect of uncertainty on the behavior of households and firms has important
implications for central banks.  During boom years rising inflation in tight markets can cause an
increase in expected future inflation that then leads to a spiral of rising inflation.  A central bank
that anchors expectations, i.e., that reduces uncertainty about future inflation, can more easily
avoid such an inflation spiral.     
In contrast, when the economy is weak and the central bank wants to increase demand,
the uncertainty of households and firms depresses spending.  By reducing uncertainty about
future demand,  the central bank can hope to stimulate spending.  As recent experience shows,
reducing uncertainty about future demand is  much more difficult than providing a nominal
anchor to limit future inflation.
This brings me now to the central question about how the Federal Reserve and other
central banks can deal with uncertainty in setting monetary policy.  I will divide my analysis into
three parts: first, the role of formal models and model-based rules; second, informal target rules
like the inflation targeting practiced by the Bank of England and the European Central Bank; and-4- JacksonHole.2003
third, a case by case approach to making decisions under uncertainty.  
There is now a large literature that uses explicit models of the economy to derive
“optimal” policies, i.e., policies that minimize a weighted sum of the variances of inflation and
real short-term growth of output while holding the mean inflation rate at some specified low
level.  A recent development of such modeling is the emphasis on finding a “robust rule” that has
reasonably good performance under a variety of different plausible simple models of the
economy even though the rule is not strictly optimal for any one of those models.  
Such model-based exercises and robustness tests are useful for helping economists and
some policy officials to think about these issues.  But the models are far too limited for this to be
an operational guide to policy.  The models inevitably give inadequate attention to financial
conditions, to changing institutions, to international markets, and to many other things. The
criterion used to derive policy rules in the optimization models is also too limited, generally 
focusing on symmetric volatility in output and inflation rather than the risk of a deep recession or
runaway inflation. Thus the models help to organize thinking but are not a substitute for
judgement. 
In practice, central banks use models to help organize conditional forecasts and
sometimes as a starting point for decision-making.  But no central bank uses such a formal model
to derive its actual policies just as no company or bank uses a formal model to make its key
management decisions.  It is important that models continue to be developed and expanded to
make them increasingly useful.  But for the foreseeable future they will be an aid to judgement
rather than a substitute for judgement.-5- JacksonHole.2003
This brings me to the less elaborate rules or target procedures that have been adopted by
many central banks and to inflation targeting in particular.  An inflation target commits the
central bank to aim at a particular inflation rate or range, typically to be achieved over a
relatively short multi-year horizon and with the understanding that the central bank may choose
to miss the target if unusual conditions make that appropriate.
Such a numerical target is attractive for anchoring inflation expectations, with potentially
favorable effects on the economy and on financial markets.  But all good things come at some
cost. The potential gains from anchoring inflation expectations are no exception.
For example, an inflation target might actually weaken the credibility of a central bank if
the central bank cannot or does not achieve the target value or range, especially if this failure to
deliver persists for several years.  Alternatively, a central bank might actually set its policy at
some point in time to achieve the target inflation rate in order to reinforce its credibility even
though doing so entails other outcomes, or risks, that it would otherwise want to avoid.
The decision of whether to adopt a numerical inflation target policy requires balancing
these advantages and disadvantages. Recent research by Laurence Ball (2003)  shows that the
greater progress in reducing inflation in countries with inflation target rules reflects the higher
rates of inflation that prevailed when targeting was introduced rather than any particular
effectiveness of targeting per se.
Of course, a government or body politic that does not trust its central bankers to avoid
increasing inflation might always want to impose such a rule to hold the central bankers
accountable and to prevent their temptation to use unexpected monetary easing and inflation for
a temporary economic stimulus.  But if we take a more benign and principled view of central1  The paper by Kenneth Rogoff (2003) shows how inflation rates have declined in
virtually every country around the world over the past few decades, including those with and
those without explicit inflation targeting policies.  It does not appear to be necessary to tie the




1, the desirability of adopting an explicit numerical inflation target depends on the need
to do so in order to achieve inflation credibility.
I believe that  the Federal Reserve has now earned that credibility by its record over the
past twenty years, i.e., by delivering on its repeated statement of the goal of price stability.  That
credibility is reflected in the low inflation forecasts that are implicit in the yield differences
between ordinary Treasury bonds and the inflation-protected Treasury bonds at every maturity.
In contrast, for a new central bank like the European Central Bank or a central bank that has
recently allowed very high rates of inflation, the advantage of an explicit inflation target may
outweigh the disadvantages.
This implies that the decision to have or not to have an inflation target should not be
regarded as a permanent decision.  There are conditions that would justify or require a change
with respect to numerical targeting, either adopting or exiting from such a policy.
This brings me to the operational issue of how to deal with uncertainty on a case by case,
instance by instance,  basis. The Federal Reserve does not need a rule like the Taylor rule or
some more robust rule to be applied mechanistically in all circumstances.  Indeed, as I have
argued, trying to replace judgement with such a rule would generally  be counterproductive. 
The Fed only has to decide at each FOMC meeting what it will do then to the current
interest rate and what it will say to the public about its actions and its intentions. That requires an
implicit Bayesian decision analysis of the risks associated with different decisions, recognizing-7- JacksonHole.2003
that the outcome of different policies depends on the unknown state of the economy and the
nature of the economy’s  reaction to policy changes.   That approach is what  Chairman
Greenspan called a  “risk management” approach to monetary policy (Greenspan, 2003).  
Although it is Bayesian in spirit, it avoids the technical difficulty of putting probability
distributions on the parameters of a formal model or collection of formal models. Trying to do
that strikes me as an essentially impossible task because the models are all “false models” that do
not correspond to the actual economy.  How can an economist put a subjective probability
distribution on the parameters of a model when the economist believes that the model itself is
false? 
 Of course, in making specific decisions, the Fed or other central bank has to consider not
only the possible short-run effects of its action and statement but also the effect of its choice and
its statement on the public’s expectations of future monetary policy and therefore of future
inflation.
How should uncertainty be taken into account in making this policy choice?  The so-
called “certainty equivalence” principle that uncertainty should be ignored and only the mean of
each variable or parameter be used is essentially wrong .  It is valid only under very restrictive
conditions that are not applicable in practice. More general models can imply either smaller or
larger changes in the interest rate because of uncertainty , depending on the structure of the
model and on the nature of the uncertainty (see Walsh, 2003).  So there is not much practical
help here.
A paper by Milton Friedman, published more than 50 years ago (Friedman, 1951) offered
an interesting insight on how policy should be influenced by uncertainty.  Friedman noted that-8- JacksonHole.2003
the level of aggregate demand at any point in time can usefully be regarded as the sum of the
demand that would exist with no active policy plus the effect of current and past policy changes. 
The variance of aggregate demand is therefore the sum of the “no policy” variance and the
“policy induced variance” plus twice the covariance between these two components.  An active
policy is therefore stabilizing (in the sense of reducing the variance of nominal demand) only if
the covariance is negative and large enough to outweigh the increased variability introduced by
the active policy.
This implies that the smaller the (absolute size of the )  negative correlation, that is, the
poorer the ability of the Fed to time its policies in an offsetting way – the smaller should be the
variability of the policy instrument.  Friedman interpreted this as reason for a  relatively inactive
policy, and in the limiting case,  for a constant growth rate of money.  .  
But Friedman’s analysis, when applied on a case by case basis, suggests that the strength
of the policy action should reflect the confidence with which the Fed believes that its action will
be stabilizing and therefore the degree of uncertainty that it then faces. It also suggests that
the appropriate action in the face of uncertainty depends on how difficult and how expensive it
would be to reverse the policy or to correct an unwanted outcome after it occurs.
This implies that a  strong expansionary monetary policy is more appropriate when the
economy is far from full employment, when inflation is low, and when inflation expectations are
desirable. In those conditions, the uncertainty about exactly where the economy is and exactly
how strongly and quickly it would respond to lower interest rates  is less important than it would
be in an economy that was closer to full employment and that had a higher rate of inflation. This
example also illustrates the importance of asymmetric risks.  -9- JacksonHole.2003
A prudent man (or, perhaps, I should  say a prudent Bayesian) carries an umbrella even
when the forecast says there is only a small chance of rain.  If there is no rain, he suffers the
small inconvenience of carrying the umbrella.  But if he does not bring the umbrella and it does
rain, he may  suffer the much larger inconvenience of being caught in a downpour.  The prudent
central bank should behave similarly, accepting a high probability of a small adverse outcome in
order to avoid the small risk of a very serious bad come.  
Chairman Greenspan (2003) gave two examples of such behavior by the Fed: at the time
of the Russian default and of the LTCM collapse.  Monetary policy at the end of last year
(lowering the federal rate from 1.75  percent to 1.25 percent) and the Administration’s tax policy
could both be  characterized as prudent in the same sense because of the asymmetric nature of
the risk faced at that time.  Although a continued recovery seemed likely, it was far from a sure
thing. Without further stimulus, the nascent upturn could lose steam, output could decline, and
low inflation could become deflation.  In short, a very bad outcome.  In contrast, an
unnecessarily strong monetary and fiscal stimulus could do little harm with the then current
economic conditions.
The Fed pursued a prudent policy of lowering the Federal Funds raise from 1.75 to 1.25
percent and the Congress enacted a substantial tax stimulus.  In retrospect, that was a risk worth
taking. But even if it hadn’t been needed, it would have been the prudent thing to do in the light
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